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BATE C. TOMS III*

The French Response to the
Extraterritorial Application
of United States Antitrust Laws
France, in response to perceived abuses in the extraterritorial application
of United States antitrust laws,' enacted on July 16, 1980, Law No. 80-5382

*Mr. Toms practices law in Paris.
All translations contained in this article, including of the text of the Law, are by the author
and are not official.
'The extraterritorial application of United States laws, especially of United States antitrust
laws, has caused considerable controversy, in particular in the United Kingdom which has also
recently enacted protective legislation as described below. Note 12 infra. See PERSPECTIVES
ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (J. Griffin,
ed. 1979); Jones, Extraterritoriality in US Antitrust: An International "Hot Potato", II INT'L
LAW. 415 (1977); Note, The Extraterritorial Reach ofAmerican Economic Regulation: The Case
of Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 315 (1976); Note, Offshore MutualFunds: ExtraterritorialApplicationof the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1225
(1972); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 8
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 741 (1978); Corcoran, The Trading With the EnemyAct andthe Controlled Canadian Corporation, 14 McGILL L.J. 174 (1968); George, ExtraterritorialApplication
oPenalLegislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609 (1966); ExtraterritorialEffects of UnitedStates Tax
Laws, 12 INT'L LAW. 581 (1978) (ABA Panel discussion); Special Committee on Commodities
Regulation, The ExtraterritorialImplications ofthe Commodity Exchange Act, 32 REC. A. BAR
CITY OF N.Y. 492 (1977); Note, ExtraterritorialApplicationof United States Laws: A Conflict of
Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (1976); Hacking, The IncreasingExtraterritorialImpact
of US Laws. A Cause/or Concern Amongst FriendsofAmerica, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1
(1979); see generally K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958)
(This is the classic writing on the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws.
Although its citations are now somewhat dated, much of its analysis is still of current value. A
new edition is expected soon. See note 69 infra); notes 3, 4, infra.
The United States is, however, not the only nation to enforce its laws extraterritorially. For
example, Germany and Australia among other nations apply their competition rules extraterritorially. Hermann, The LongArm oGerman Competition Law, Financial Times, Oct. II, 1979
at 22, col. 3; Taylor, The Extraterritoriality ofthe Australian Antitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L LAW. &
ECON. 273 (1979). France gives its penal laws extraterritorial effect. See generall, Notes 35, 36
infra. Extraterritorial regulation may also come from multinational organizations, such as the
European Economic Community. See generaly Jacobs, ExtraterritorialApplication ofCompetition Laws: An English View, 13 INT'L LAW. 645 (1979).
2[ 1980] J.O. 1799. The text of the Law, with a translation, is contained in Annex I to this
article.
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(hereafter referred to as the Law). 3 The Law is a sweeping prohibition of
various types of communications and investigations that are typical of
administrative antitrust investigations and of antitrust litigation by private

parties in the United States, and is intended, in particular, to prevent dis4
covery in France based only on United States law.
Yet although the Law was inspired to impede enforcement of United
States antitrust laws, its prohibitions are not so limited. The Law literally

applies to forbid most business-related communications, if harmful to
France, to foreign public authorities by persons having a presence in

France, and to prohibit the gathering in France of business-related information with a view to foreign litigation-without any requirement that an
antitrust law be involved. For example, the Law could prohibit a reply by
the United States parent of a French company to a United States Com-

merce Department request for information about reexports from France of
United States-origin technology. 5
'This is not the first time that French law has explicity conflicted with the extraterritorial
enforcement of United States law. The most well known instance previously is the decision in
Fruehauf v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, 11965] J.C.P. 11 14, 274 bis (Cour d'Appel. Paris)
(An English language translation of a summary of the decision is found at 5 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 476 (1966)). The Fruehauf case arose when the United States Department of the
Treasury, acting pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, obliged a United States company to order its French subsidiary, Fruehauf France, to refuse to sell trucks under a signed
contract with another French company because the ultimate purchaser was the Peoples
Republic of China. In response to a suit brought by directors representing the minority French
shareholders, the Court of Appeals of Paris affirmed the appointment of a judicial administrator to take-over control of Fruehauf France temporarily in order to fulfill the contractregardless of any commands to the contrary from the parent company or the Department of
the Treasury. See Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemr Act to Foreign Corporations
Owned byAmericans: Reflections on Fruehauf P. Massard,, 83 HARV. L. REV. 579 (1970).
'By virtue of the French reservation to the Hague Convention, letters of request in aid of
pre-trial discovery are not authorized in France under the procedures of the Convention, however, the Convention does not expressly oblige exclusive use of its procedures either, as is
noted below. Although pre-trial discovery based on United States law has been frequently
conducted in France in the past, Borel and Boyd claimed, even before the enactment of the
Law, that the conduct of such pre-trial discovery was of questionable legality under French
law. See Borel & Boyd, Opportunitiesfor and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France for
Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35, 45 (1979).
'United States agencies often attempt to enforce their laws extraterritorially by proceeding
in the United States against the United States parent with respect to the activities of its subsidiary abroad. See Craig, supra note 3, at 579 n. 3; Berman & Garson, United States Export
Controls-Past,Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 866-76 (1967). This practice of
holding the parent responsible for its subsidiary is questionable under United States law given
the separate incorporation of the parent and subsidiary. But see Craig, supra (suggesting such
regulation be avoided, but concluding it is lawful where intended by Congress). At least so
long as the parent does not exceed its role as shareholder and Congress has not explicitly
authorized such indirect extraterritorial regulation based on the shareholder relationship
alone, the subsidiary's corporate veil should not be pierced. See Steven v. Roscoe Turner
Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160 (7th Cir. 1963); Maule Industries Inc. v. Gerstel, 232
F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1956); Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transportation Co., 31
F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J.); American Trading & Production Corp. v. Fischback
& Moore, Inc. 311 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. 111.
1970) (veil not pierced and parent not held liable
even though it provided general supervision to protect investment in a subsidiary); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y. 2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966); Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co., 244

French Response to U.S. Antitrust Laws
Since the Law reaches many activities that would otherwise be assumed
to be lawful, there will likely be many unknowing violations. The purpose
of this article is to call attention to the Law and attempt to interpret some of
the Law's many ambiguities based on its legislative history. It is as yet too
early to conclude how the Law's broad prohibitions will actually be
6
enforced, if at all, by French authorities.
I. The Law's Prohibitions
The Law, in Article i, provides that French nationals, French residents
and other entities present in France are prohibited from communicating
anywhere economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical information to foreign public officials if such communication is harmful to France.
Article I-bis of the Law forbids any person in France from requesting,
investigating or communicating such information with a view to foreign
judicial or administrative proceedings.
Articles I and 1-bis, the basic prohibitions of the Law, were enacted as
amendments to Article 1 of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 19687 (hereafter
referred to as the 1968 Law) forbidding certain communications to foreign
officials concerning maritime commerce. As will be described, these
amendments completely rewrote Article 1 of the 1968 Law. Article 2 of the
1968 Law, which required any person receiving a request for communications prohibited by Article I to inform the appropriate ministry, was
amended to apply also to requests in violation of Article l-bis. However,
Article 2 is not so important since the Law provides no penalties for failure
to comply with Article 2's disclosure requirement. The final revisions made
N.W.84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); note 36 infra. But cf In re Investigation of World
Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 385 (D.D.C. 1952) (concerning pre-trial discovery, parent
ordered to produce subsidiaries' documents).
From a policy standpoint, such extraterritorial regulation based on shareholder nationality
is generally unwise given the resentment it can generate in the nation affected, especially if
jobs are threatened as a result and the affected nation can if it wishes render such regulation
ineffectual, as shown by the Fruehauflitigation. See note 3 supra.
Assuming a case similar to Fruehaufis initiated presently by a request to a United States
corporation by the Treasury Department for information concerning the compliance of its
French subsidiary with the Trading with the Enemy Act, the case might go no further than a
response from the United States parent that transmission of the requested information is prohibited on the basis of the Law.
"Whether or not actively enforced, the potential for enforcement of the Law will affect, and
has already affected, the conduct of United States and other non-French litigation involving
France. Although there have not yet been any prosecutions under the Law, a number of government ministries and institutions have in particular instances advised in writing that proposed communications would violate the Law.
Even if the government is not inclined to enforce the Law, possibly private parties may
cause it to do so. In general, under French law private parties suffering particular monetary
loss because of a violation of a penal statute may initiate criminal proceedings before a "juge
d'instruction," thereby involving the public prosecutor, and may recover civil damages as a
result of those proceedings. See note 51 infra.
'119681 J.O. 7267. The 1968 Law was implemented the next year by an order ("arretd") of
the Minister of Transportation. [1969] 1O. 544.
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by the Law, to the third of the three articles of the 1968 Law, which provided for penalties, were to roughly double the possible fines in order to
account for inflation and to add a reference to Article 1-bis. As revised,
Article 3 provides penalties for violations of Articles 1 and 1-bis of two to
six months in prison or fines of 10,000 to 120,000 French francs or both.
The following discussion considers the prohibitions of Articles 1 and Ibis, beginning with a brief outline of their legislative history. 8
II. The Legislative History
The Law was initially proposed for the government in the French Senate
by Joel Le Theule, then Minister of Transportation, on June 30, 1979 as a
bill 9 to amend the 1968 Law which prohibited the supplying of certain specified information on maritime transportation to foreign public authorities.
The proposed bill would merely have extended these prohibitions to air
transportation. The 1968 Law had been adopted as a response to antitrust
investigations by the United States Federal Maritime Commission involving French maritime transport companies.' 0 The proposed extension of the
1968 Law to aviation was similarly prompted by United States antitrust
investigations, in particular by the questioning in the United States of two
representatives of Air France, and by the proposal of the United States
Civil Aviation Board to withdraw the antitrust immunity granted to the
International Air Transport Association, of which France's two leading airlines, Air France and the Union de Transports Atriens, are members.II
During consideration of the proposed bill by the Senate on May 29, 1980,
the limitation on the bill's scope to transportation was deleted and the bill
was amended to apply generally to information on economic, commercial
and technical matters. A prohibition on investigations in view of litigation
was also added. It appears that these amendments to the bill, proposed on
behalf of the government by Joel Le Theule, were inspired by the enactment in the United Kingdom on March 20, 1980 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (hereafter referred to as the British Protection Act)
which was adopted to deter the extraterritorial enforcement of United
8

Reviewing the legislative history (called "travaux pr~paratoires") of a statute to determine
the intent of the draftsmen is one of the recognized methods of statutory interpretation used by
French courts. See A. WEILL, DROIT CIVIL'173-75 (3d ed."1973); Capitant, L'Interpr6tation
des Lois d'Apris les Travaux Priparatoires, [1935] Recueil Dalloz H. (Chr.) 77; H. DEVRIES,
CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAWYER 254-55 (1975).
'The bill was presented as Projet de Loi N*. 469, Sdnat Seconde Session Ordinaire de 197879.
'(See S. REP. No. 210, B. Legrand, Reporter for the Commission on Economic Affairs and
the Plan 2, 3 (April 17, 1980) [hereafter referred to as the First Senate Report].
"See First Senate Report at 3-4. Many other examples of extraterritorial "abuses" were
cited in the Senate and Assembly debates, such as an antitrust lawsuit brought in the United
States against Air France by a United States citizen claiming his ticket for a flight from Paris to
Rome cost too much. J.O. D6bats Stnat, May 30, 1980 at 2194 [hereafter referred to as the
First Senate Debate]. See also First Senate Debate at 2195 (criticizing information requests by
United States authorities concerning the Airbus sale to Eastern Airlines).
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States antitrust laws against British companies.' 2
The bill with these revisions was passed by the Senate on May 29 and
promptly considered by the National Assembly on June 24, 1980.13 The
lengthy Assembly Report accompanying the bill also justified its broad
reach as a response to the extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust laws,14 necessary in particular to prevent pre-trial discovery in France
under United States law by private United States parties. 15 The Assembly
"See First Senate Debate at 2196.
The British Protection Act responds to United States antitrust enforcement by authorizing
the United Kingdom's Secretary of State to prohibit communications of commercial information prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and by providing for the recovery
in the United Kingdom by the United Kingdom defendant in an "overseas" antitrust action of
the non-compensatory portion of treble damages it has paid to the plaintiff. The Act also
provides for enforcement, against assets in the United Kingdom, of judgments by courts of
other countries for the recovery of such non-compensatory treble damages, but only if the
other country in question reciprocally enforces United Kingdom judgments for the recovery of
such penalties. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 959, April 10, 1980 at F-I
(reprinting text of British Protection Act); Gordon, ExtraterritorialApplication of UnitedStates
Economic Laws: BritainDraws the Line, 14 INT'L L. 151, 152, 161-64 (1980); Comment, Antitrust.- British Restriction on Enforcement ofForeignJudgments, 21 HARV. INT'L L. J. 727 (1980);
Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. The British Protection of Trading Interest Act,
1980, 75 A.J.I.L. 257 (1981).
The provisions in United States antitrust laws allowing non-compensatory treble damages
were especially criticized by the French legislators considering the Law when it was proposed,
many of whom recommended that the proposed legislation be amended to allow recovery by
French defendants of the non-compensatory portion of treble damages. See note 15 infra. See,
also, Press Release of Australian Attorney-General relating to the Westinghouse Suit (October
5, 1980) [hereafter referred to as the Press Release] (noting criticism of United States treble
damages remedy by the thirty-eight Commonwealth countries at their Barbados meeting in
April 1980)). However, Le Theule acknowledged that to amend the bill proposed to the Senate
to include such provisions from the British Protection Act should require further study, and
would ordinarily involve consideration over at least one to two years by several ministries.
The present amendments were intended, according to Le Theule, as a limited step that could
be immediately taken to respond to the antitrust "inquisition" directed against French companies by the United States. First Senate Debate at 2196.
Australian legislation blocking foreign discovery was also cited during the Senate Debate.
See First Senate Debate at 2196. Many other countries have also introduced legislation limiting foreign discovery, including Canada (with Ontario and Quebec also acting individually),
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and
New Zealand, all acting largely in response to United States litigation. See Press Release
(citing, in particular, the Evidence Amendment (No. 2) Act enacted by New Zealand on July
18, 1980); D. Hacking, supra note 1,at 8 & n. 30 (citing statutes of Canada (including of
Quebec), Switzerland and the Netherlands); BREWSTER supra note I, at 47-5 1.
"It was considered as Projet de Loi N' 1771 (which had been introduced on May 30, 1980).
J.O. Assembl6e Nationale, June 25, 1980 [hereafter referred to as Assembly Debate] at
2231-36.
'During the discussions in the legislative history on the extraterritorial enforcement of
United States antitrust laws, there were also a few incidental references indicating other possible applications of the Law, and a few brief references to problems caused by other types of
United States laws (such as the anti-dumping laws). See Assembly Debate at 2231; Assembly
Report at 8, 25; Senate Debate at 2194-95.
"National Assembly Report No. 1814, A. Mayoud, Reporter for the Commission on Production and Exchanges (June 19, 1980) [hereafter referred to as the Assembly Report].
The non-compensatory portion of treble damages provided for under United States antitrust
laws were especially criticized in the Assembly Report and Debates. Assembly Report at
26-27, 30-31 (stating that antitrust penalties are being used in the United States to protect
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Report acknowledged that the 1968 Law had had only limited success in

protecting French companies and observed that it is uncertain whether
United States courts would recognize, as a defense to a discovery order, 16a
claim that compliance with the order would be illegal under French law.
Nonetheless, the Report stated that it was hoped that the Law's broad reach

would in a sufficient number of instances impede United States antitrust
enforcement and thereby prompt negotiations on the governmental level to
17
resolve the disputed extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust laws.

The Assembly, after debate and adoption of several amendments consistent with the Senate revisions, approved the bill.' 8 The Senate then briefly
considered the bill as passed by the Assembly, 19 and the accompanying
Second Senate Report, 20 and adopted the bill on June 30, 1980.21 This bill

was signed by President Giscard d'Estaing and entered into force on July
16, 1980. Significantly, the wide reach of Articles 1 and 1-bis of the Law
was never debated in the Senate and the Assembly. Instead, the Law was

enthusiastically endorsed by both the government and the opposition. The
only issue was whether more should be done.22 Consequently, the subse-

quent election of Mitterrand as President in May 1981 and of a socialist
majority in the Assembly the following month, and the resulting change of
government, would not be expected to alter support for the Law. The next

two sections of this article consider the limitations to the Law's broad
prohibitions.
Il1.

Article I-Prohibited Communications to
Foreign Public Authorities
Article 1 of the Law prohibits the communication by French nationals,

persons usually resident in France, and officers, representatives, agents and
employees of entities having an office or other establishment 23 in France, of
domestic industry; proposes study of statutory provisions for the recovery of such treble damages along the lines of the British Protection Act); Assembly Debate at 2232 (statement by
Alain Mayoud).
"'See, e.g., Assembly Report at 34, 39, 46. See also Assembly Debate at 2234. For references to some of the United States cases that underlie doubt about the effectiveness of the
illegality defense, see note 62 infra.
"See, e.g., Assembly Report at 23, 46; see also Senate Report at 4.
"Assembly Debate at 2236.
"'The Assembly passed bill was introduced into the Senate on June 25, 1980 as Projet de Loi
No 339.
2
Senate REP. No. 352, B. Legrand, Reporter for the Commission on Economic Affairs and
the Plan (June 24, 1980) [hereafter referred to as the Second Senate Report].
"J.0. Debats S6nat, July 1, 1980 at 3386-87 [hereafter referred to as the Second Senate
Debate].
22
See, e.g., notes 12, 15 supra.
23
The French subsidiary of a foreign company, unlike a branch office, is not ordinarily considered an "office" or "establishment" of the parent majority shareholder, but rather a separately incorporated entity, see de Ricci & Tuot, France: Branch or Subsidiary in BRANCHES
AND SUBSIDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 57-59 (1973).
Such subsidiary
would likely not be considered an "establishment" for purposes of the Law. The parent should
not, solely because it has a French subsidiary, be subject to the Law's provisions. (This
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documents and information on economic, commercial, industrial, financial
or technical matters. It applies "anywhere," including extraterritorially,
and to all communications, whether in writing, orally, or by any other
means (such as by audio-visual transmission, telecommunications or com24
puters).
There are two significant limitations to Article l's prohibitions. First, it
only forbids communications to foreign public authorities, The discussions
in the Senate and Assembly Reports and debates concerning United States
judicial, congressional and administrative proceedings indicate that this refbroadly to refer to communicaerence to public authorities was intended 25
tions to any governmental body or forum.
Second, the prohibitions are based on the effects of the communication.
The only communications that are prohibited are those capable or likely of
harming or prejudicing ("de nature A porter atteinte") the sovereignty,
security or essential economic interests of France or public policy ("ordre
public"). The limits of this broad criterion are, however, not easily delineated. The legislative history manifests an intent that the provision not be
construed narrowly to restrict the Law's reach. For example, the Assembly
Report indicates that the term "public policy" is used comprehensively to
refer to both French domestic and international public policy, stating:
[Your Commission] proposes equally to refer to contraventions of public policy
because every encroachment on our territorial jurisdiction by a foreign administrative or jurisdictional authority is an affront,
not only to domestic public policy,
26
but also to international public policy.

The Assembly Report also observed that the use of the term sovereignty
("souverainet"), adopted based on the British Protection Act, refers to
many different concepts and, consequently, is both comprehensive and
ambiguous. After going on to note various aspects of this term, the Report
recommended not that the reference to sovereignty be qualified, but rather
that this vague reference be retained and additional references be added to
make certain that the Law applies in particular to economic and jurisdictional sovereignty. The Report concluded that:
The reference to the notion of national sovereignty is, thus, indispensable, but the
sovereignty in economic and jurisdictional fields being at issue, it is not useless to

complete this criterion by making references using a terminology that will remove
all ambiguity in this respect. Your Commission therefore proposes to you to
assumes, of course, that the parent respects the subsidiary's separate incorporation and does
not involve the subsidiary as its agent or accomplice in acts prohibited by the Law).
2
Assembly Report at 42-43.
"See, e.g., Assembly Report at 9-10.
2
Assembly Report at 43 (translated from French). The French text states, "[Votre Commission] propose 6galement de faire r~ference a des atteintes Al'ordre public car tout empietement
sur notre comp6tence territoriale par une autoritt administrative ou juridictionnelle 6trangere
est une atteinte non seulement A notre ordre public interne, mais aussi Al'ordre public international."
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complete the text of the 1968 Law by27a reference to harms to the security and
essential economic interest of France.
One issue which might be raised concerning Article l's prohibitions is
whether their apparent breadth and vagueness indicate that they must be
administratively defined by a ministerial order before becoming enforcea-

ble, as is often the case for French legislation. Putting constitutional issues
aside, 28 however, it is clear from the legislative history that although implementing regulations were anticipated, the Law was intended to be immediately self-executing. The Law in the form initially adopted by the Senate,
like the 1968 Law, provided that the communications that would be prohibited would be only those specified beforehand by ministerial orders
("arrdt~s"), but this explicit requirement for administrative implementation
was deleted by the National Assembly. Instead, the Law as enacted only
contains, at the end of Article 1, the phrase "specified by the administrative
authorities as necessary" ("prdcisds par l'autorit6 administrative en tant que
de besoin"). While this phrase might otherwise be arguably ambiguous, a
review of the legislative history reveals that the phrase was added not to
require administrative implementation generally, but rather to provide
expressly that the appropriate ministry could additionally, for a particular
case "as needed," specify communications to which Article 1 would definitely apply. The phrase was intended to show that the Law enters into
29
force immediately upon its enactment.
As the Assembly Report explains:
Your Commission has moved to the end of Article I the reference to texts which
can be issued by the administrative authority in order to delineate the reach and
breadth of the first article. It appeared to it more logical to define, in the text of
the Law, those documents or information that could not be communicated and
then to leave to the texts of implementation, issued as necessary,
the specifications
30
that could appear useful to the administrative authority.
27Assembly Report at 43 (translated from French). The French text reads: "La r6f6rence A
lanotion de souverainetd nationale est, certes, indispensable, mais la souverainet6 dans les
domaines 6conomique et juridictionnel 6tant en cause, iln'est pas inutile de compl6ter ce
crittre en faisant appel Aune terminologie levant toute ambiguitt Acet 6gard. Votre Commission vous propose donc de compl6ter le texte de ia loi de 1968 par une ref6rence Ades atteintes
a las~curitt et aux int6rets 6conomiques essentiels de la France." Id. at 37, 39.
"'Arguable constitutional issues with respect to the Law are relatively unimportant because
the Law has been promulgated without challenge in the Conseil Constitutionnel, the French
constitutional court. Constitutional issues can only be raised before the Conseil Constitutionnel by the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister or by the President or sixty members of either the Assembly or the Senate, prior to the Law's promulgation. No other court can
hold a law unconstitutional. CONST. arts. 34, 38, 41, 54, 61 (Fr.); CON. CONST., [1961] J.O.
8631. See Beardsley, Constilutional Review in France, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 189, at 244-45; H.
DEVRIES, supra note 8, at 105-16; C. FRANCK, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 298-308 (1978).

"gSee Assembly Report at 36, 44; Assembly Debate at 2235 col. 2; Second Senate Report at

4; Second Senate Debate at 3386.
30
Assembly Report at 44 (translated from French). The French text states: "[V]otre commission a renvoy6 Alafin de 'article premier lar6f6rence aux textes qui pourront etre pris par
l'autorit6 administrative afin de pr6ciser laport~e et l'6tendue de l'article premier. 11lui est en
effet apparu plus logique de d6finir, dans le texte de la loi, quels documents ou renseignements
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Along these lines, Alain Mayoud, Reporter for the National Assembly
Commission for Production and Exchanges, stated:
the 3formula "as necessary" has as its goal to make the law immediately applicable. '

Article 1 also provides that its provisions are subject to ("sous reserve
des") treaties and international agreements. The legislative history shows
that this provision was added in order to permit ordinary governmental
32
information transfers regulated by treaty (such as of customs information)
and to allow discovery pursuant to the Hague Convention of 18 March
1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
(hereafter referred to as the Hague Convention).33 This provision is
repeated in Article 1-bis, and its significance is considered below in the
discussion concerning the limitations on discovery in France created by
Article 1-bis.
IV. Article 1-bis-Prohibited Communications and
Investigations in France
Article 1-bis, like Article 1, applies to documents and information relating to economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters,
whether written, oral or in any other form. Article l-bis, however, prohibits not just communicating, but also requesting and investigating such information and documents. Furthermore, its prohibitions are based on the
function rather than the effect of the act in question. Article l-his applies
only to actions taken leading to the establishment of proof with a view to
foreign administrative or judicial "procedures" and does not specify that
the likely effect of such use must be to harm France or contravene public

policy.
The use in Article 1-bis of the word "proc6dures" arguably gives Article

1-bis an extremely broad scope, since this French term can mean, in
English, procedures as well as proceedings. For this reason, it could be
ne pourront etre communiquds puis de renvoyer Ades textes d'application pris en tant que de
besoin les pr6cisions qui pourront paraitre utiles A l'autorit6 administrative." See Assembly
Debate at 2234.
3
Assembly Debate at 2231, col. 2 (translation from French). The French text states, "la
formule 'en tant que de besoin' ayant pour but de rendre la loi immddiatement applicable."
12See Assembly Report at 42. Id. at 35 (concerning patent information). Under the French
Constitution, treaties (even if previously adopted) prevail over conflicting laws, but the Assembly Report states that it wanted to make this clear regarding the Hague Convention in particular (perhaps because the French constitution requires, as a condition of such effect, that the
treaty be reciprocally applied by the other party to it). Assembly Report at 41; CONST. art. 55
(Fr.); C. FRANCK, supra note 28, at 242-55; Beardsley, supra note 28,. at 252.
The 1968 Law achieved the same result by limiting its prohibitions to communications by
private, as opposed to public, law entities (using the phrase "une personne morale de droit
priv6"), however, this approach was not followed by the Assembly when it considered the bill
that was adopted as the Law because it was feared that United States courts might characterize
French government-owned companies as not being private law entities (and therefore not recognize an illegality defense based on the Law). See Assembly Report at 42.
"Hague Convention 23 U.S.T. 2555; T.I.A.S. No. 744. See Assembly Report at 41-44; Second Senate Report at 3; Second Senate Debate at 2231; see note 32 supra.
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claimed that Article 1-bis applies to almost any communication if related to
any administrative or judicial procedure. Yet the legislative history shows
that the Law's sponsors were concerned not with communications pursuant
to procedures per se, but rather with the gathering of evidence for trial-type
proceedings. Thus, the French term "procedure" is used in the text of Article 1-bis with reference to proof for such "procedures" which indicates it
34
should be read as meaning proceedings.

Unlike Article 1, Article 1-bis applies to all persons ("toute personne"),

whether or not having significant connections with France. The reach of
Article 1-bis is, however, probably limited territorially since the maximum

imprisonment for violations of the Law is six months. Ordinarily a French
penal law providing for imprisonment of less than five years35 applies to
acts committed outside of French territory only if those acts are also pun-

ishable in the country where committed (and, in such case, only for the acts
"The Assembly Report, when discussing the reach of the Law, often uses the word "procedure" in contexts where it can only mean proceedings, such as "recherche A l'occasion d 'une
procedure etrangere" (inquiry at the occasion of a foreign proceeding), "recherche en vue
d'une procedure non engagee ou meme 6ventuelle, donc hors convention" (inquiry in view of a
proceeding not instituted or even possible, thus outside of the [Hague] Convention), or "le
texte interdit . . . A l'occasion ou en vue d'une procedure administrative" (the text prohibits
. . . at the occasion of or in view of an administrative proceeding). Assembly Report at 45.
The legislative history demonstrates only an intent to force parties to "proceedings" to use the
Hague Convention. See Assembly Report at 10-11. Certainly, the Hague Convention procedures were not drafted to provide a means for complying with all procedures by which facts
are submitted to agencies, such as tax returns, and nothing in the legislative history indicates
the French legislators were disturbed by compliance with such foreign procedures. The
Assembly Report, while acknowledging the possible vagueness in the language used, stressed
the intent that the prohibition be construed with reference to the establishment of proof for
"procedures" (presumably meaning proof for trial-like proceedings), so as to limit the arguable
ambiguity in the language used in Article I-bis, stating:
Inquiries or communications of documents or information will be prohibitedif the inquiries
lead to the establishment a/proof. This reference to the establishment of evidence appears to
[the Assembly Commission] in effect necessary in order to tone down the very general character of the prohibition which could be taken to absurd lengths.
Assembly Report at 46 (translated from French). The French text states, "les recherches ou
communications de documents ou renseignements seront interdites si les recherches tendent d la
constitution depreuves. Cette r6ference Ala constitution de preuves lui apparait en effet ndcessaire pour attenuer le caractere tres general de l'interdiction qui pourrait aller jusqu'A
l'absurde." The reference to proof for "procedures" indicates that even if one reads the French
term "procedures" to refer in English also to procedure, this should refer only to procedure for
those trial-like proceedings at which evidence is submitted. But cf. Guillerm-Kirk & Batailion,
France. Tax Implicationsof Confidentialiy Law, 7 TAX PLANNING INT'L 8 (1981) (translates
"procedure" as proceeding, but applies Article I-bis broadly to communications of corporate
tax3 5 information, see note 52 infra).
See Code penal (C. PEN.), arts. 1, 8, 9 (Fr.). Violation of a penal law providing for imprisonment of less than five years constitutes a "d~lit," whereas if the law is punishable by imprisonment of five or more years or death, its violation constitutes a "crime." The generally
applicable rules for applying French penal laws extraterritorially provide for different results
depending on this distinction. See Code de procedure penale (C. PR. PEN.) arts. 689-96 (Fr.).
For example, penal laws providing for "crimes," unlike those providing for "delits," generally
apply extraterritorially with respect to acts by French citizens and to acts where a victim is
French, regardless of whether the act is also unlawful under the laws of the country where the
act is committed. C. PR. PEN. art. 689 (Fr.).
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of French citizens), unless the prohibition in question provides otherwise. 36
Article 1-bis gives no indication that it is intended to apply outside of

France, and the activities it prohibits are in general lawful in the United
States and, following local procedures, in most other countries. The fact
that Article l-bis applies to all persons, whether or not French, further indicates that its reach was intended to be limited to French territory. By comparison, Article 1,which applies only to French nationals and others with a

presence in France, contains the phrase "en quelque lieu que ce soit" mean"Article 689 of the Code of Penal Procedure provides that penal laws punishable by imprisonment for less than five years ("d6lits") apply extraterritorially to acts by French citizens, but
only if the acts are also punishable in the country where committed. See C. PR. PEN. art. 689
(Fr.); C. LOMBois, DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL 375 (1979); J. Bigay, Les Dispositions
Nou'elles de Competence des Juridictions Franfaises /'Egard des Infractions Commises d
I'Etranger, [1976] Recueil Dalloz Sirey (Chr.) 51-53; G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, PROCEDURE PENALE 363-418 (i1ed. 1980). Consequently, so long as investigations and other discovery abroad are legal under the laws of the country in which carried out, Article I-bis could
not be applied extraterritorially based on Article 689.
There are two other generally applicable provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure pursuant to which "dWlits" may be prosecuted extraterritorially. To begin with, Article 694 states
that if the "d6lit" defined by the penal law is "attentoire Alas~retd de l'Etat," meaning that the
act prohibited is detrimental to the security of France, then the penal law applies extraterritorially to all persons, whether French or of any other nationality. Such jurisdiction, based on the
nature of the infraction, is referred to as "competence r~elle." Article 694 is generally interpreted to refer to the section of the Penal Code on "crimes et dWlits contre las0ret6 de l'Etat"
(C. PEN. arts. 70-130 (Fr.)), however, such "juridiction r~elle" may apply for other infractions
against French security. See LoMBoIs, supra, at 387-406. Although Article I might be considered as creating extraterritorial jurisdiction based on "compltence reelle," Article l-bis should
have no such extraterritorial reach since harm to France is not an element of Article i-bis's
prohibitions..
A "d~lit" may nonetheless be prohibited extraterritorially depending on the factual circumstances since Article 693 of the Code of Penal Procedure provides that if any act constituting
an element of the infraction occurs in France, then the infraction is considered to have
occurred on French territory. The penal law in question would therefore apply to both French
citizens and other nationals. LOMBOIS, supra, at 302-18. (Since "effects" may therefore be a
basis of jurisdiction, this rule parallels the "objective territorial principle" which as applied by
United States courts in antitrust cases has been criticized in France. See also note 69 infra).
Article l-bis could on this basis be applied to foreign discovery if any "act" involved in such
discovery occurs in France.
The only other basis for prosecuting such a "d~lit" extraterritorially is if the penal prohibition in question itself provides for its extraterritorial application, as is the case for Article 1.
Such express derogation in a statute from the generally applicable statutes defining jurisdictional reach is rare. See LoMBOIS, supra, at 297-99, 300 n. 247; Simon-Depitre, Les Rgles
Matdriellesdans le Conflit de Lois, [1974], REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt
591-606.
Under United States law, it is well established that a statute should not be given extraterritorial effect absent a clear Congressional mandate otherwise, unless the nature of the statute
requires its extraterritorial application. See United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir.
1977); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 38 (1965). However, several statutes, such
as the Trading with the Enemy Act (as amended), were intended to be and are applied extraterritorially. See notes 1,3 supra. A recent example is the application of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act during the freeze of Iranian assets in branches of United
States banks in the United Kingdom, France and other foreign countries.

596

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

ing "in any place wherever" or "anywhere" and consequently should apply
extraterritorially.

37

Article 1-bis states that its provisions are subject to treaties and international agreements, like Article 1 provides, and also that they are subject to

laws and regulations in force. As observed in the preceding review of Article 1,one of the purposes of the reference to international agreements is to

except from the Law's prohibitions inquiries pursuant to the Hague Convention. 38 The reference to laws was added to Article 1-bis because the
French Code of Civil Procedure also applies to define the communications
39
or investigations permitted in France under the Hague Convention.
The legislative history makes clear that the Law is intended to require
exclusive use of the Hague Convention procedures and forbid pre-trial discovery in France based only on United States legal procedures. 40 The
Assembly Report noted critically that although both France and the United
States are signatories of the Hague Convention, it has been neglected by
many United States plaintiffs4 1 who have instead obliged French persons
with interests in the United States to submit to discovery in France based
only on United States legal procedures. 42 The Assembly Report was especially hostile towards the ability of parties under United States law to

obtain pre-trial discovery without direct judicial supervision, a procedure
43
totally contrary to French precepts for procedure.
The neglect of the Hague Convention was attributed in the Assembly
Report to its cumbersome, time-consuming procedures, which do not work
3There
is some irony in Article l's special extraterritorial application, since the Law's enactment was prompted by the extraterritorial enforcement of United States laws which is perceived in France as being unjustified.
"See note 33 supra.
' See Assembly Report at 33, 45; C. PR. Civ. arts. 733-48 (Fr.) (for example, C. PR. Civ. art.
740 (Fr.)) permits the parties to participate directly in proceeding pursuant to "letters of
request" (but only if not "pre-trial"). Assembly Debate at 2234, col. 2.
'For a concise description of the procedures for discovery by foreign lawyers in France
under the Hague Convention and the French Code of Civil Procedure, see Borel & Boyd,
supra note 4. See generally Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of
the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial

Matters (June 12-15, 1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1425 (1978); see also.

Horlick, A Practical Guide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14 INT'L LAW. 637
(1980).
"' Based on information obtained from the French Ministry of Justice and the United States
Consulate General, there were less than twenty-five "letters of request" (the principal means
by which discovery may be compelled in France during a foreign trial) during the period from
October 6, 1974, when the Hague Convention became effective in France, to mid-1978. Of
these letters of request, only one pertained to a commercial matter. See Borel & Boyd, supra,
note 4, at 45. Instead, as Borel & Boyd describe, United States lawyers had preferred to ignore
the Hague Convention and had instead engaged in what is characterized in the Assembly
Report as "fishing expeditions" or "tourisme juridique" (legal tourism). See Assembly Report
at 10, 17. Since passage of the Law, there has been greatly increased use of the Hague Convention provisions for the non-compulsory taking of evidence before consular officials.
42
See Assembly Report at 17.
"3See Assembly Report at 10, II; Borel & Boyd, note 4 supra, at 36-37 (concise description
of discovery in French litigation). See also Assembly Debate at 2233 (criticism of wide scope
possible under United States law for discovery requests, citing example of a French company
being asked for all of its correspondence since 1954 as well as all of its research budgets).
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well in commercial contexts, and to the French reservation" to the Conven-

tion preventing the use of letters of request in aid of pre-trial discovery in
France. The Hague Convention also fails to provide for discovery by
administrative agencies. 45 However, the Convention does not state that its
procedures for discovery are to be exclusive. The Assembly Report

declared that the Law would remedy this omission by prohibiting all discovery not expressly permitted by the Hague Convention as accepted by
France,4 6 thereby prohibiting all compulsory pre-trial discovery by letters
"Assembly Report at 12, 18. [1975] J.O. at 3980-85 (Declaration stating text of the Hague
Convention as ratified, together with France's reservations); see Conference de La Haye de
Droit International Priv6, [1979] REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRiVt 247-48.
As of June 1978, all of the other contracting states, except the United States, had taken the
reservation preventing letters of request for pre-trial discovery, which reservation is permitted
by Article 23 of the Hague Convention. However, the United Kingdom, while declaring in
1976 that it would not execute "Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial
discovery of documents," also declared that it "understood" such phrase as including any
request which requires a person:
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter of Request
relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody or power; or (b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody
or power.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters-Notification (of the United Kingdom) (1976). This "understanding" has been interpreted by the United Kingdom's experts to the Special Commission
(who initially proposed the Article 23 reservation power when the Convention was drafted) as
limiting the United Kingdom's reservation to only those non-specific types of requests to
which clauses (a) and (b) apply, thereby permitting pre-trial requests for "particular documents." See Permanent Bureau, Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1425, 1427-28 (1978).
After the June 1978 meeting of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague
Convention, the United States delegation reported that the unqualified reservations by the
civil law nations were based in part upon their mistaken belief that pre-trial discovery could be
had under United States law merely to develop a lawsuit (for "fishing expeditions") rather
than only to obtain evidence for a lawsuit that has already begun in earnest. See Report of the
United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 18
March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (June 1978),
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1417, 1421-24 (1978); Borel & Boyd, supra note 4, at
43-44. The United States delegation expressed hope that these reservations would be reconsidered and withdrawn or else limited as the United Kingdom had done, and the Special
Commission concurred. Since then, Sweden, Denmark and Norway have made declarations
similar to that of the United Kingdom limiting their pre-trial discovery reservations to nonspecific letters of request. See Submission of the United States (to Hague Conference on Private International Law) regarding Recent Developments Relative to the Hague Convention of
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (October 8,
1980) (also containing 1980 draft clause approved by Organization of American States Meeting of Experts to allow pre-trial discovery of specific documents despite Article 9 of the InterAmerican Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad which authorizes signatories to
refuse pre-trial discovery of documents).
Nonetheless, in view of the enactment of the Law and the extensive criticism of substantive
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction and of pre-trial discovery for United States litigation
revealed in the legislative history of the Law, it appears unlikely that France will soon withdraw or limit its reservation prohibiting pre-trial letters of request.
"Assembly Report at 11, 18, 27-28; Assembly Debate at 2231.
'Assembly Report at 17, 18, 45.
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of request.

47

By its terms, Article 1-bis literally applies to any investigations, requests
or communications of the types of information or documents specified in
the Law by anyone while in France if "leading to the establishment of proof
with a view to foreign administrative or judicial proceedings or as a part of
such proceeding." Since this prohibition does not depend upon harm to
French interests, it could be applied to communications and investigations
made for the defense of French interests and not just to the activities of
plaintiffs and prosecutors. Yet the legislative history shows only that the
Law was adopted to protect French interests from abusive foreign discovery
48
procedures and excessive assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Nowhere is there an indication that the Law was to impede litigation preparations by French companies, either for their own defense or to institute
lawsuits abroad to protect their interests, and arguably such applications
were unintended. On the other hand, it could be claimed that the purpose
of Article 1-bis was to oblige all discovery for foreign proceedings to follow
the Hague Convention procedures, and that such purpose is served by
applying Article 1-bis to French defendants as well as to foreign prosecutors and plaintiffs.
Article 1-bis could literally be read to prohibit even communications
between a lawyer and his French client if the communications concern
proof for a foreign proceeding. However, in a written response published
on January 26, 1981 to a question posed in the National Assembly on the
effect of Article 1-bison lawyers, the Minister of Justice stated that "the law
obviously does not have as a purpose. . . the limiting or controlling of the
relations of international lawyers with their clients. '' 49 The Minister, in
making this observation, emphasized that Article 1-bis was intended to
oblige parties to foreign litigation to comply with the Hague Convention
and applicable French laws. Presumably, his statement on the Law's effect
on lawyer-client relations reflects the view that the Law was only intended
to reach communications between unrelated persons, such as witnesses and
'7 The Assembly Report, elaborating on the Law's investigatory prohibition, asserted that
Article I-bis
applies not just to pre-trial discovery, but also prior to the pre-trial stage, stating
that the Law forbids "investigations in all directions led by corporate law firms in search of
clients." Assembly Report at 45 (translated from French). The French text states, in full:
"Cette interdiction couvre la phase pr6judiciaire dite 'pre-trial discovery of documents' tout
autant que la recherche tous azimut men~e par des cabinets d'affaires en quete de clients."
(citations omitted). See also Assembly Debate at 2231 (Investigations by administrative agencies8 are prohibited in France by the Law.)
"See Assembly Report at 17, 18, 45; Second Senate Report at 4.
49
J.O. Assembl6e Nationale-Questions et Responses, January 26, 1981 at 373 (translated
from French). The French text states, "Ialoi n'a-t-elle 6videmment pour objet ... ni de
limiter ou de contr6ler les relations des avocats internationaux avec leurs clients." More complete excerpts from the Minister's response and from the question posed to him (with translations) are contained in Annex B to this article. See Herzog, The 1980 French Law on
Documents and Informalion, 75 A. J. 1.L. 382, 384 (1981) (Law not intended to interfere with
lawyer-client communications, but would apply to conversations with witnesses and adverse
parties).
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,dher parties to a litigation. Assuming so, it should follow that communications and investigations within a French company by its employees and
lawyers and other agents to gather evidence were not intended to be prohibited either. Although a ministerial interpretation made in a response to an

Assembly question has no formal legal effect and is thus not binding on the
courts, because the government sponsored the Law such statement would

be considered persuasive evidence of the legislative intent behind the
Law.

50

V. Possible Applications of the Law
In advance of administrative implementation or informal interpretations
by the new French government, it is difficult to predict how the prohibitions

of Articles 1 and 1-bis will actually be enforced by it or construed by
French courts. 5 ' The possible reach of these articles, read literally, is
extremely broad.
For instance, Article 1 could be applied to any communication anywhere

to foreign public authorities by companies having an office in France, if the
communication is found to be harmful to France. As indicated, the term
"public authorities" refers not just to national governments and their agen'See notes 51, 66 infra. The Minister's response would be especially persuasive evidence of
the legislative intent since the Law was sponsored by the government and this interpretation
follows the Law's enactment by only about six months.
"The express non-enforcement by the previous government of the French anti-boycott law
with respect to the Arab boycott of Israel presents an example of how "interpretations" can
reformulate and weaken laws. See Directive of May 9, 1980 Concerning Application of Article 32 of Law No. 77-574 of June 7, 1977, [1980] J.O. 1174 (the "Directive"), interpreting the
prohibition of discrimination based on "origine nationale" to be intended to forbid only racial
discrimination against ethnic minorities within a nation and not to forbid discrimination
against a nation (e.g. Israel), an interpretation apparently motivated by the French government's foreign trade objectives with respect to Arab countries. See Opinion Concerning
Application of Article 32 of Law No. 77-574 of June 7, 1977, [1977] J.O. 4360 N.C. This
circular, which excepted Mid-Eastern trade from the anti-boycott law on the basis of the
importance of this trade, was annulled by the Conseil d'Etat (Cons. D'Etat, Ass. 18 avril 1980,
req. No. 9643 et 9644, [1981] Recucil Dalloz Sirey (Jur.) 3-4. Socit6 Maxi-Librati creation et
autres), but its effect was reestablished by the subsequent Directive reinterpreting the antiboycott law. See Bismuth, Annulation de i",4 is du Premier Ministre du 24juill. 1977 ei Resurrection de la Loi Penale '"4ntiboycotage," [1981] Recueil Dalloz Sirey (Jur.) 4. See note 66
infra. In a "Circulaire" dated July 17, 1981 concerning Law No. 77-574, the Prime Minister of
the new government, Pierre Mauroy, repealed the Directive. [1981] J.O. 2002.
Concerning possible litigation, it should be recognized that even if the government did not
bring a prosecution under the Law, this would not necessarily be the end of a matter since,
under French law, private parties suffering particular monetary damage because of a violation
of a penal law may initiate criminal proceedings. As civil parties to a criminal prosecution,
they may recover civil damages (alternatively, they may bring their own civil suit separately
from any criminal action). See C. PR. PEN. arts. 1-20, 85-91 (Fr.); G. Stefani & G. Levasseur,
supra note 36, at 449-51. This right to be part of the criminal action is subject to the qualification that if the penal law is construed to be only for the general benefit of the public, and the
plaintiff has only suffered as an ordinary member of the public, then a court may find that no
private right of action can be based on the violations of the penal law (as has been held in suits
based on violations of French competition laws and health regulations)). See C. PR. PEN. arts.
85-91 (Fr.); note 35 supra (defining "d6lit"); H. DEVRIES, supra note 8, at 226-27; Larguier,
CivilAction for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39 TUL. L. REV. 686 (1965).
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cies, but also to local governments and agencies (and arguably to international organizations and agencies). The Law does not specify that the
information or documents must originate in France or that they must necessarily pertain to activities in France.
Article 1 could possibly be held to reach pre-merger notifications to the
Federal Trade Commission of the United States and similar antitrust
filings. Among other applications, the Law might be applied to information
provided to banking authorities, documents filed with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission or Department of Commerce (such as
to affirm compliance with foreign boycotts) and any other transmission of
facts to a foreign government entity that may result in an inquiry by a foreign government or in litigation or may otherwise be acted upon to the
detriment of French interests. Application of the Law in these contexts will
likely depend on the facts of the particular case.
There is little guidance given as to what constitutes harm for purposes of
Article 1, and whether some meaningful harm is required. Arguably, if the
communicated information results in a foreign administrative investigation
requiring the French party to spend funds and efforts in defense, then the
type of harm this legislation was intended to protect against would have
occurred. Probably almost any lawsuit brought against a French party by a
United States company having a French presence would involve some communications in violation of the literal terms of the Law.
Article 1-bis is also loosely written and can be literally read to apply to a
great variety of activities never considered by the Senate or the Assembly.
Since it uses the general verb "rechercher," meaning "to investigate" or "to
inquire into" to define prohibited acts, Article 1-bis could be construed to
apply to most intellectual activities in France, whether or not involving any
52
communication with any person, done with a view to foreign litigation.
' 2For example, one recent article by two French lawyers has interpreted l-bis broadly to
prohibit the communication of financial and commercial information abroad, by French subsidiaries and divisions of multinationals, for tax audits and the preparation of foreign tax
returns. See Guillerm-Kirk & Batailion, supra, note 34. The authors construe the phrase
"tendant A la constitution de preuves" as used in Article l-bis to mean that all communications, requests and research of the specified types of information are prohibited if the information "could constitute evidence to be used in present orfuture foreign administrative or judicial
proceedings." Id. (emphasis added).
The Assembly Report, however, indicates that Article 1-bir applies, not based on whether
evidence could be used for such a proceeding, but rather on whether the evidence is actually
obtained within the framework of, or in view of, such a proceeding (including, with respect to
any person who researched information in good faith (in other words, not for such a proceed-

ing), to apply Article l-bis once it is known that this information is used for such proceedings).
As the Assembly Report states:
In effect, article one bis forbids the research and the communication of documents or information [not only] within the framework of a foreign judicial or administrative proceeding,
but also in view of such a proceeding. The sanction with respect to any person making
investigations will therefore apply once it is known what usage is made of the information or
documents which had been communicated to him in good faith.
Assembly Report 45. (The French text states: "En effet, l'article premier bis interdit la
recherche et la communication de documents ou renseignements dans le cadre d'une proc6-
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Some comfort is derived, however, from the former Minister of Justice's
response, discussed above, to the National Assembly question in which he
observed that the Law was not intended to reach relations between a lawyer
and his client. This indicated that the Ministry of Justice was interpreting
the Law reasonably with reference to the legislative intent which was concerned with foreign discovery in France, rather than by playing on ambiguities to construe the Law to its literal limits in order to impede foreign
proceedings as much as possible. 53 Hopefully, the new French government
will do likewise.
One other possible ambiguity in the Law's reach is whether it applies to
arbitration proceedings. Presumably it does not unless the arbitration is so
regulated under local law as to be considered a part of a nation's judicial
process. The legislative history refers only to the Law's effect on judicial
proceedings in government courts and never discusses arbitration.
VI. Defenses
As a defense to a prosecution under the Law, one could attempt to limit
the reach of Articles 1 and 1-bis to just those activities necessarily reached
by the Law. The legislative history contains few statements limiting the
Law's scope, but does emphasize certain activities as being targets of the
Law's prohibitions, such as formal discovery proceedings in France that do
not follow the Hague Convention procedures. One could claim that Article
1-bis only prohibits such formal questioning of another party or of a witness, of the kind that produces a transcript which can be introduced as evidence in foreign proceedings, and does not reach either informal inquiries
intended to gather background information or off-the-record conversations
54
among the parties.
Both Articles 1 and 1-bis could also be distinguished based on the type of
information sought. Arguably, the "economic, commercial, industrial,
financial and technical" information these articles apply to is only that type
of economic and technical data which is used as evidence as such. For
example, the commercial data upon which economic analysis for an antitrust action is typically based. So construed, the Law would not apply to
information that is "economic" or "commercial" only incidentally because
it involves business activities. On this basis, the Law would not reach, for
dure judiciaire ou administrative 6trangere, mais aussi en Vue d'une telie proc6dure. La sanc-

tion a l'6gard de toute personne se livrant A des recherches pourra donc intervenir une fois
connu l'usage fait des renseignements ou documents qui lui auraient t6 communiqu6s en
toute bonne foi.")
"See also Address by Gilbert Guillaume, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (May 21, 1981) (believes that Law not applicable to routine administrative inquiries not
having a pre-trial character or to information volunteered by French companies to foreign
courts to support lawsuits brought by such companies to maintain their rights, such as to protect patents).
'See note 34 supra. There are, however, statements in the legislative history indicating a
broad construction. See note 47 supra.
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instance, a party's statements about its intentions or evidence about what it
had reason to know when it did an act prohibited by United States law,
even if the act in question involved a business activity (such as concerning
the reexport of United States-origin goods). For this reason, the Law
should not apply to legal advice or discussions about the legal effects of
business activities. 55
Article l's application to French nationals should also, in practice, be
limited to prohibiting communications likely to harm other French nationals. For example, if the information communicated could lead to an antitrust prosecution of other French companies. It would then be easy to
claim that French economic interests were jeopardized. However, if the
French national transmitting the information is the only one who can be
injured, arguably French interests should not be harmed since the French
national would not communicate the information unless, taking all its interests into account, it would gain more (or lose less) by communicating than
by refusing to do so. Premerger notifications filed with the Federal Trade
of a communication often unlikely to
Commission would be an example
56
harm other French nationals.
Another possible defense for alleged violations of the Law involving the
United States is the argument that the Law is inconsistent with the Convention of Establishment of November 25, 1959 between France and the
United States (hereafter referred to as the Establishment Convention)5 7
which governs the treatment by France and the United States of their
nationals. To the extent conflicts with the Law exist, the Establishment
Convention would prevail since the prohibitions of Articles 1 and 1-bis
were expressly made subject to ("sous reserve des") treaties and international agreements.58 Such a conflict arguably exists between Article I of
the Law and Article III.1 of the Establishment Convention. Article 111.1
states:
"The text in French is not very precise, using the expression "d'ordre 6conomique .
meaning "relating to" or "in the field of economics ... ."in effect leaving the prosecutors and
courts discretion to give the Law a broad or narrow scope. As observed, the former Minister of
Justice stated that the Law was not intended to interfere with lawyer-client relations. Similarly, it would appear that the Law was not intended to reach conversations between lawyers
on opposing sides, for example to discuss settling issues in a case, since this would not constitute the type of "inquisition" of witnesses with which the legislative history was concerned.
Furthermore, the ability to have such discussions is necessary for the lawyer's performance of
his professional duties. It could therefore be argued that such essential professional activities
is subject to laws and regulations in
are exempt under Article I-bis anyway since Article 1-bis
force and the French legal profession (including both "conseils juridiques" and "avocats") is
established by statute. See generally Professions Judiciaries et Juridiques--Rforme, J.O.
April 30, 1974) (special printing of collected statutes and decrees on "conseils juridiques" and
"avocats").
"6Where the French national is a multi-national, there will exist the risk that one could argue
it is favoring its foreign interests over the interests of France.
"Establishment Convention, 11 U.S.T. 2398; T.I.A.S. No. 4625. It was adopted by France
as Decret N* 1330 of December 7, 1960.
"Furthermore, under French law, treaties prevail over inconsistent laws anyway, so long as
the other party to the treaty reciprocally upholds its obligations. See note 32 supra.

French Response to U.S Antitrust Laws
Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall be accorded
national treatment with respect to access to the courts of justice as well as to
administrative tribunals and agencies, within the territories of the other High
Contracting Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defense of
their rights. . ..

One could possibly claim that Article 111.1 guarantees that the nationals
of both France and the United States shall be accorded unrestricted access
by both countries to the full judicial and administrative process of both
countries on the same basis as the nationals within each of the countries.
Arguably, this provision also allows "access" that is compelled by a court or
administrative agency. It could similarly be claimed that Article 1-bis contradicts the Establishment Convention because it interferes with such
"'access".60

It could be argued in response that this interpretation of Article 111.1,
although literally possible, is inconsistent with the apparently limited purpose of the Establishment Convention that each country agree to accord
equitable treatment to the nationals of the other. Consequently, Article
III.1 would be read as requiring only that nationals be accorded national
treatment by the other country and not as also preventing either country

from trying to immunize the activities of its own nationals from litigation
abroad. 6 1 Whether a French court could be persuaded to find a conflict
'"Establishment Convention, Art. 111.1. The text in French states:
Les ressortissants et soci6t~s de chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes ben6ficient du
traitement national en ce qui concerne l'acc~s aux tribunaux judiciaires ainsi qu'aux
tribunaux et organismes administratifs situ~s dans les territoires de l'autre Haute Partie contractante a tous les degres de juridiction en vue de l'exercice tant actif que passif de leurs
droits.
11960] J.0. 11,220. (Article 111.1 does not specify, as do most of the other provisions, that it
applies only to each nation with respect to the nationals of the other.); see also Art. IV (rights
of nationals of either country may not "be subjected to impairment, within the territories of the
other High Contracting Party, by any measure of a discriminatory character"); Art. VI (on the
retaining of lawyers); Art. IX. I (forbidding discriminatory "obligations"); Art. I. Cf.Art. XI
which states: "Each High Contracting Party will take the measures it deems appropriate with
a view to preventing commercial practices or arrangements ... which restrain competition,
limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices or arrangements have or might have harmful effects on trade between the two countries."; Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 74 A.J.I.L. 657, 667-68

(1980) (opinion of James R. Atwood, Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department, that
clauses such as Article XI affirm the United States' right to enforce its antitrust laws in extraterritorial contexts).
'In addition, Article 1-bis of the Law would appear literally to conflict with Article 11.2 of

the Establishment Convention, which states: "Nationals of each High Contracting Party shall
enjoy, within the territories of the other High Contracting Party,freedom of conscience, of
worship, of information and of the press. '(emphasis added)'" However, the United States

and France are also parties to the Hague Convention, which they agreed to over ten years after
the signing of the Establishment Convention. It can be argued that Article l-bis of the Law
simply implements the Hague Convention relating to information for litigation and that, to the
extent this implementation is inconsistent with the provisions of the Establishment Convention, the later and more specific provisions of the Hague Convention should have precedence
concerning litigation information.
"See also Walker, Convention of Establishment Between the United States and France, 54

A.J.I.L. 393 (1960) (drafters of Establishment Convention primarily concerned with foreign
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between the Law and the Establishment Convention would likely depend
upon the actual circumstances of the case before it (in particular, on
whether the allegedly illegal acts were undertaken for the defense of French
interests). The argument that such a conflict exists, even if unlikely to be
accepted, might be worth making nonetheless in order, with a view to the
Law, to show the limits of literal interpretations of texts that ignore their
drafters' intent.
Finally, the legislative history of the Law demonstrates concern that the
defense of "excuse lgale" (meaning "legal excuse," often referred to in the
United States as the illegality defense) 62 will not be upheld by United
States courts if asserted by French parties based on the Law to justify failing to comply with a United States discovery order. The Assembly Report
recognized that this defense is not absolute in the United States. 63 Yet, the
French legislators ignored the other side of this issue-whether a French
person could assert the defense of "excuse 16gale" in French courts to justify
64
complying with a United States discovery order in violation of the Law.
Possibly such a defense would be upheld in France, which arguably makes
the assertion of the corresponding illegality defense in the United States
appear less persuasive.

investment, apparently by United States companies in France; does not indicate what drafter's
intent was regarding Article III).
2
Courts in the United States have distinguished the issue of whether discovery can be compelled where in contravention of foreign law, from the issue of whether such illegality is a
defense to sanctions for non-compliance with a discovery order. To the former issue, United
States courts have held that discovery may be compelled, although it has also been held that
discretion exists to refuse to compel such discovery. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Arthur Andersen v.
Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Trade Development Bank v. Continental Insurance Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirmed that although
the trial court could order discovery, it had discretion to refuse to compel discovery where
illegal in the foreign jurisdiction with respect to which discovery was requested).
To the issue of whether remedies should be imposed for non-compliance with a discovery
order, courts have generally accepted the defense of illegality, except where the court involved
did not believe this defense was raised in good faith. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (sanctions not imposed since
compliance with discovery order was illegal in foreign jurisdiction where discovery was
ordered); State of Ohio v. Arthur Andersen, 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
833 (1978) (court considered illegality defense of defendant to be only a diversionary tactic
raised afterwards and not made in good faith; sanctions imposed).
3
See Assembly Report at 34, 39, 46 (also observes that United States courts may threaten
and impose contempt citations); Assembly Debate at 2234, col. 2.
"The Assembly Report may have had this defense of "excuse 16gale" in mind where it
stated concerning Article I, "these sanctions will only apply in the unlikely case where the
firms refuse to use the protective provisions offered to them. In all other cases, these potential
sanctions will assure in the eyes of foreign judges the legal foundation of the illegality defense
of which the firms will not fail to make use." Assembly Report at 48 (translated from French).
The French text states "ces sanctions ne s'appliqueront que dans rhypothese peu probable otl
les entreprises refuseraient d'utiliser les dispositions protectrices qui leur sont offertes. Dans
tous les autres cas, ces sanctions potentielles assureront aux yeux des juges 6trangers le fondement juridique de l'excuse lgale dont les entreprises ne manqueront pas de se pr6valoir."
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Conclusion
Although the legislative history was concerned with United States antitrust investigations and litigation, both by private and governmental parties, the wording of the Law was not limited to these concerns and therefore
its possible application is uncertain. Hopefully, the French government will
narrowly interpret the Law's reach by administrative action or definitively
limit the Law's scope by prompting legislative revisions. Le Theule, the
former Minister of Transportation, stated during the Senate and Assembly
debates that administrative orders would be forthcoming. 65 As yet, however, there has been no significant administrative implementation. 66 Nor
have any legislative proposals been made or suggested in the Senate or
67
Assembly to define the Law's scope.
"'First Senate Debate at 2199 (administrative order ("arrett") to be promulgated within
three months of enactment); Assembly Debate at 2236 (order to be issued by Transportation
Ministry soon after enactment of Law); Assembly Report at 36. However, since the Law's
reach has been expanded to other areas than just transportation, administrative implementation by the Transportation Ministry only would be of limited usefulness.
'The only implementing decree so far is Decree No 81-550 of May 12, 1981 of former
Prime Minister Barre designating the Minister of Foreign Affairs as the repository for notifications under Article 2, while still permitting such notifications to be made to other ministries
that may be involved. As observed, failure to make such notification is not punishable. Such
notification does provide one method for documenting unlawful requests in order later to contest execution in France of foreign judgments obtained in connection with acts in violation of
the Law. See Herzog, supra note 49, at 385.
The effect of any such administrative regulations or interpretations may be uncertain for
several reasons. To begin with, Article 1 of the Law, the only article expressly authorizing
administrative implementation, does not designate any one minister with this responsibility.
The legislative history concerning Articles 1 and I-bis contains references to the relevant or
competent ministry and to "the different ministerial departments" that will be concerned with
the Law. Assembly Debate at 2234; see Senate Report at 2197. The legislators apparently
anticipated that choice of the competent ministry would depend upon the subject matter of the
proceedings. Consequently, no one ministry, such as the Ministry of Transportation, would
appear capable of issuing regulations that would be applicable for all cases. (However, Ministry of Justice interpretations could have such effect with regard to its prosecution decisions.)
Second, although the implementing regulations can limit the Law's reach, such regulations
and, as noted earlier, some interpretative circulars, may be held by the Conseil d'Etat to be
invalid if found to conflict with the underlying statute. See note 51 supra (opinion limiting
anti-boycott law held invalid).
The government might interpret the Law less formally in order to avoid possible invalidation. For example, the interpretation by the government might take the limited form of an
interpretation note 51 supra (Directive limiting anti-boycott law held invalid).
The government might interpret the Law less formally in order to avoid possible invalidation. For example, the interpretation by the government might take the limited form of an
interpretation in a "circulaire" which is not subject to invalidation by the Conseil d'Etat.
Another informal method of making an interpretation public without risking invalidation by
the Conseil d'Etat is by ministerial response to a question posed by a legislator in the Senate or
the Assembly, as exemplified by the Minister of Justice's response concerning lawyer-client
relations. However, although any such interpretaiion would ordinarily be accorded great
weight and would provide guidance as to the present government's prosecutorial intentions, it
would not be binding on courts in criminal proceeding. See generally G. VEDEL & P.
DEVOLVE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (7 ed. 1980); DEVRIES, supra note 8, at 102-103, 254-55.
67
There are various approaches by which the Law could be revised to serve the goals underlying the Law's adoption while not reaching activities which the legislative history indicates
were not intended to be prevented (for example, to ensure that the Law allow preparations for

606

INTERNATIONAL LAIWYER

All that can presently be said for certain is that the Law is most likely to
be enforced with respect to actions brought under United States antitrust
laws against French parties. One can envision as possible situations resulting in enforcement under Article 1, communications in such antitrust
actions in the United States by plaintiffs having an office or other presence
in France, and under Article l-bis, the institution of investigations and pretrial discovery in France by the plaintiffs for such antitrust litigation.
Whether the Law will in fact be actively enforced and whether its enforcement will be limited to antitrust plaintiffs remains to be seen.
Nonetheless, it would appear in view of this defensive action by France
68
and the responses of the United Kingdom, Australia and other countries
to the extraterritorial enforcement of United States laws, that attempts by
United States courts and agencies generally to enforce United States laws
extraterritorially will be increasingly ineffective and counter-productive
until the United States unilaterally adopts a more satisfactory approach or
negotiates an acceptable resolution to these jurisdictional conflicts. 69 In the
the defense of French interests in litigation abroad). One possible revision would be to provide that Article l-bis applies only if French interests may be harmed, as Article I states.

Article l-bis could be further amended to provide that one of the ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, can exempt activities from the reach of Article l-bis, either generally or on a
case-by-case basis. The provision for administrative implementation in Article I could also be
re-written to provide expressly that activities can be exempted and to designate a single ministry to handle exemption requests. Alternatively, the Law could be limited to apply only to
those activities specified by a particular minister, as the 1968 Law provided and as the British
Protection Act provides for several of its prohibitions (for example, by empowering the Secretary of State to prohibit compliance with extraterritorial foreign laws threatening the interests
of the United Kingdom). Limiting the Law to those situations specified by a ministry would
be satisfactory so long as the persons affected by the extraterritorial application of a foreign
law notify the designated ministry of the foreign law's reach (it could even be provided that no
communication could be made or other action taken by the persons affected until such notice
was given). None of these possible revisions to define the Law's reach would make the Law
less effective in protecting those French interests with which the legislators were concerned.
"See, e.g., Cheeseright, Australia May Retaliate on U.S. Antitrust Cases, Financial Times

(Int'l ed.), Sept. 9, 1980, at 1; see note 12 supra.
"9With regard to extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction and discovery, there appears to be
greater common agreement on principles and thus potential for negotiated resolution of these
jurisdictional conflicts than is generally believed. Many, probably most, countries apply not
just the strict territorial and nationality bases for jurisdiction, but also some form of the objective territorial principle. See Shenefield, The Extra-TerritorialImpact of U.S. Antitrust Laws.
Causesand Consequences, 4 REV. SUISSE DROIT INT'L CONCURRENCE 59, 62-63 (1978); notes

12, 35, 36 supra (French, Australian and German law); Craig, supra note 3, at 586 (effects
within territory invoke the territoriality principle; cites nationality and other principles as
exceptions to the territoriality rule); Research under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard
Law School, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 A.J.I.L. pt. 2 at 445

(supp. I, 1935); but see Jacobs, supra note I (United Kingdom states that it asserts jurisdiction
based only on the territorial and nationality principles).
Problems arise, however, not just because the United States basis for jurisdiction may be
contested, but also because of conflicts with nations which claim concurrent jurisdiction based
on other recognized jurisdictional principles and which believe their interests are much more
significantly affected. The Fruehauf case is one example. See note 3 supra. Other types of
conflicts may arise where, for instance, the foreign nation asserts that the acts of one of its
instrumentalities are protected by sovereign immunity or that a company subject to its jurisdiction was compelled to do the act complained of because of the nation's laws and policies.
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meantime, United States courts and administrative agencies involved in
antitrust proceedings in particular would be well advised-in the interest of

promoting cooperation in the effective enforcement of United States laws
and goodwill generally-to consider at the outset the conflicting interests of

the other nations involved. Resort to extraterritorial process and enforceThe occurrence and importance of problems such as these with other nations may be lessened if both at the time legal action is initiated and before a judgment is rendered, an assessment is made by United States courts and, in criminal cases, by prosecutors of the relative
significance of the United States and the foreign interests, as Brewster recommended. See
BREWSTER, supra note 1, at 444-46. Where jurisdiction is asserted, foreign reaction might be
mollified at the outset by a decision or other explanation demonstrating the reasonableness of
the United States position. In fact, United States courts are becoming increasingly sensitive to
the need to consider foreign interests, at least by weighing foreign policy considerations from a
United States viewpoint. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597

(1976);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 40 (1965) (listing factors courts should consider to moderate conflicts of jurisdiction); but see
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Twenty-Nine Foreign &
Domestic Uranium Producers), 5 TRADE REG. REP., CCH § 63, 183 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1980);
Case Note, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 515 (1980).
Another proposal of Brewster's which merits further consideration is to require that the
Department of State be formally consulted by other agencies, prosecutors and courts prior to
or when legal proceedings commence and prior to relief being ordered if significant interests of
other nations are involved. See BREWSTER supra. This practice would encourage a more
coherent United States position at the outset, and result in United States foreign policy interests being more accurately assessed by agencies and courts. Hopefully, it would also permit
more constructive government to government consultations beforehand rather than only in
response to foreign governments that have learned of a problem from their outraged nationals.
Such prior consultation may often be appropriate where a United States government agency is
directly involved, as in the Fruehauf case.
Early resolution of particular jurisdictional conflicts by government to government consultation would be facilitated if a multinational agreement on jurisdictional principles could be
negotiated that would emphasize the common interests of all nations in jurisdiction not being
strictly limited territorially. At the same time, such an agreement could clarify the principles
according to which extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction should give way.
It is also appropriate for the United States unilaterally to reconsider whether treble damages
are always appropriate in multi-national contexts. Based on the principles of law of many
other nations, awards so in excess of compensatory damages seem unfair, especially where the
jurisdictional bases for these awards are disputable. Should not some discretion be exercisable
by courts if compensation seems appropriate, but because of jurisdictional conflicts, penalties
are not? As the Australian Attorney General has observed, the concept of the "private attorney general" being encouraged, by the prospect of massive punitive damages, to enforce
United States economic policy within the United States may often be inappropriate when most
of the activities are by foreign persons on foreign territories. See Press Release; notes 12, 15
supra.
Finally, concerning discovery, if it is perceived that agreement has been reached on principles for the extraterritorial reach of substantive laws, then it will be more likely that France
and other nations will follow the United Kingdom's lead and similarly limit their reservations
preventing pre-trial letters of request. See note 12 supra. A formal policy of unilateral
restraint in making discovery requests by United States government entities (including more
direct control over discovery and concern for principles of comity by courts) would also
encourage the French to permit certain administrative inquiries. (The Justice Department's
Antitrust Division has announced that it will exercise such restraint. See Shenefield, supra, at
67-68). According to the legislative history of the Law, the French are willing to attempt to
negotiate a resolution to their differences with the United States over extraterritorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Assembly Report at 42. It would appear that, in view of French law principles
on the reach of France's extraterritorial jurisdiction and the current status of foreign discovery
in France because of the Law, the United States has much to gain from such negotiations.
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ment, despite serious conflicts with the interests of other nations exercising
concurrent jurisdiction, should be had only where United States' interests
are vitally concerned. The legal jurisdiction and process of other nations
should be respected. Forgetting these basic principles of comity will only
incite further reactions preventing even the most necessary and justifiable
extraterritorial applications of United States law.
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Annex I
Text of Law No. 80-538 ofJuly 16, 1980, aspublished in the Journal Officiel de la
Rokpublique Franqaiseon July 17, 1980 at page 1799.
Loi no 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 relative A la communication de documents et
renseignements d'ordre 6conomique, commercial ou technique a des personnes physiques ou morales 6trangfres.
L'Assembl~e Nationale et le S6nat ont adopt6,
Le President de la R~publique promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit:
Art. le.-Le titre de la loi n' 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 relative A la communication
de documents et renseignements Ades autorit6s 6trang~res dans le domaine du commerce maritime est modifi6 ainsi qu'il suit:
Loi relative A la communication de documents et renseignements d'ordre
6conomique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique A des personnes physiques ou morales 6trang~res.
Art. 2.-I.-L'article ler de la loi n' 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 susvis~e est ainsi
r~dig6:
Art. Ier,-Sous rserve des trait~s ou accords internationaux, il est interdit A toute
personne physique de nationalit6 franqaise ou rsidant habituellement sur le territoire franqais et A tout dirigeant, repr6sentant, agent, ou pr~pos6 d'une personne
morale y ayant son siege ou un 6tablissement de communiquer par 6crit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, en quelque lieu que ce soit, A des autorit6s publiques trangres, les documents ou les renseignements d'ordre 6conomique,
commercial, industriel, financier ou technique dont la communication est de
nature A porter atteinte A la souverainet6, A la s6curit6, aux int6rets 6conomiques
essentiels de la France ou A l'ordre public, pr6cises par l'autorit6 administrative
en tant que de besoin.
II.-I1 est insr6, apres 'article Icr de la loi n ° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 susvis~e, un
article Ier bis ainsi r~dig6:
Art. I1 bis-Sous reserve des trait~s ou accords internationaux ct des lois et
reglements en vigueur, il est interdit Atoute personne de demander, de rechercher
ou de communiquer, par 6crit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, des documents ou renseignements d'ordre 6conomique, commercial, industriel, financier
ou technique tendant A la constitution de preuves en vue de procedures
judiciaires ou administratives 6trang6res ou dans le cadre de celles-ci.
Art. 3.-L'article 2 de la loi n* 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 susvis~e est ainsi modifi:
Art. 2.-Les personnes vis~es aux articles lcr et ler bis sont tenues d'informer
sans ddlai le ministre comp6tent lorsqu'elles se trouvent saisies de toute demande
concernant de telles communications.
Art. 4.-L'article 3 de la loi n* 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968 pr~cit~e est ainsi modift:
Art. 3.-Sans prejudice des peines plus lourdes pr6vues par la loi, toute infraction
aux dispositions des articles Ier et Ier bis de la prsente loi sera punie d'un
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emprisonnement de deux mois A six mois et d'une amende de 10,000 F A 120,000
F ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement.
La pr~sente loi sera ex~cut6e comme loi de 'Etat.
Fait A Paris, le 16 juillet 1980.
Par le President de la R~publique:
Valery Giscard d'Estang
Le Premier Ministre,
Raymond Barre
Le Garde des Sceaux,
Ministre de la Justice,
Alain Peyreflte
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangtres,
Jean Franqois-Poncet
Le Ministre de l'Economie,
Rene Monory
Le Ministre de 'Industrie,
Andre Giraud
Le Ministre des Transports,
Joel Le Theule
Le Ministre du Commerce Exttrieur,
Jean-Fran'oisDeniau
Le Ministre du Commerce et de
l'Artisanat,
Maurice Charretier

French Response to U.S. Antitrust Laws
Translation of the Text of Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980
Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980 concerning the communication to foreign entities or individuals of documents and information relating to economic, commercial
or technical matters.
The National Assembly and the Senate have adopted,
The President of the Republic promulgates a law, the terms of which are the
following:
Article 1-The title of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968 concerning the communication to foreign authorities of documents and information in the field of maritime
commerce is modified as follows:
Law concerning the communication to foreign entities or individuals of documents and information relating to economic, commercial, industrial, financial or
technical matters.
Article 2-I. Article 1 of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, referred to above, is
worded as follows:
Article 1.-Subject to treaties or international agreements, it is prohibited for any
individual of French nationality or who usually resides on French territory and
for any officer, representative, agent or employee of an entity having a head office
or establishment in France to communicate to foreign public authorities, in writing, orally or by any other means, anywhere, documents or information relating
to economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters, the communication of which is capable of harming the sovereignty, security or essential economic interests of France or contravening public policy, specified by the
administrative authorities as necessary.
II. It is inserted, after Article I of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, referred to
above, an Article l-bis worded as follows:
Article 1-bis. Subject to any treaties or international agreements and the laws and
regulations in force, it is prohibited for any person to request, to investigate or to
communicate in writing, orally or by any other means, documents or information
relating to economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters leading to the establishment of proof with a view to foreign administrative or judicial
proceedings or as a part of such proceedings.
Article 3. Article 2-of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, referred to above, is modified as follows:
Article 2. Persons aimed at by articles 1 and l-bis are required to inform without
delay the relevant minister when they are in receipt of any request concerning
such communications.
Article 4-Article 3 of Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, cited above, is modified as
follows:
Article 3. Without prejudice to any greater penalties provided by law, any violation of the provisions of articles 1 and l-bis of this law will be punished by
imprisonment of from two to six months and by a fine of from 10,000 Francs to
120,000 Francs or by only one of these two penalties.
This law will be enforced as a law of the State.
Done in Paris, July 16, 1980.
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Annex II
Excerpts from the question on Article l-bis of the Law posed in the National
Assembly on September 29, 1980 and from the response of the Minister of Justice,
published'in the Journal Officiel de la Republique Franqaise-Assemblee NationaleQuestions et Reponses on January 26, 1981 at page 373 (emphasis added).
Question
35893-29 septembre 1980. M. Roger Chinaud attire l'attention de M. le Ministre
de la Justice sur certains problemes d'interpretation que pose, pour l'activite des
cabinets de juristes et d'avocats internationaux, l'Article 1c r bis . . . Compte tenu du
fait qu'une telle disposition ne saurait etre interpr6tee comme s'opposant A l'activite
des cabinets d'avocats internationaux, il lui demande si, dans ces conditions, il
n'estime pas necessaire de faire etablir A l'usage des membres de cette profession un
document d'interpretation destine Aetablir clairement les nouvelles regles juridiques
dans lesquelles doit desormais s'inscrire leur activite.
Rbsponse
Les dispositions de 'article I er bis . . . ont pour objet essentiel de faire respecter
en France l'application des regles qui definissent le regime de l'obtention des
preuves A l'etranger. Ce regime resulte . . . des dispositions du nouveau Code de
Proc6dure Civile . . . et de celle de la Convention de La Haye du 18 mars
1970. . . . assortie de la declaration faite par le Gouvernement franqais au moment
de sa ratification. . . . Le r6gime ainsi defini est destine A donner une pleine efficacite A nos relations de cooperation judiciaire internationale en permettant
l'execution sur notre territoire des commissions rogatoires selon des formes particulieres (Art. 739 du nouveau Code de Proc6dure Civile), ainsi que la mise en oeuvre,
sous des conditions tres precises, de la procedure d'obtention des preuves par commissaires (Convention de La Haye du 18 mars 1970, chap. II). I1 permet au surplus
aux parquets et A la Chancellerie, selon les cas, de contr6ler effectivement le respect
des principes directeurs de la procedure franqaise (Art. 744 du nouveau Code de
Procedure Civile, Art. 16, 17 et 21 de la Convention de La Haye precitee et Art. 2 et
3 de la declaration faite par le Gouvernement franqais). L'article 1er bis de la Loi
du 16 juillet 1980 est venu sanctionner l'interdiction de procedure sur le territoire
frangais A toute mesure d'instruction ou operation de recherche de preuve, notamment par la voie de commissaires, en dehors du cadre qui a etc defini par le nouveau
Code de Procedure Civile et par la Convention de La Haye du 18 mars 1970
precitee, plus precisement en dehors du contr6le des parquets et de la Chancellerie.
Cet article interdit de plus la communication de documents ou de renseignements
lorsque ceux-ci sont demandes ou recherches hors du cadre fixe par la loi. En
revanche, l'article 1er bis n'interdit pas la demande, la recherche ou la communication de documents ou renseignements hors du cadre de procedures judiciaires ou
administratives etrangeres. Aussi bien la loi n'a-t-elle bvidemment pour objet ni
d'entraver les relations d'affaires avec des pays etrangers, ni de limiter ou de conlrb/er
les relations des avocats internationaux avec leurs clients. Toutefois, et en application
de l'article Ir, la communication de documents ou de renseignements d'ordre
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6conomique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique a des autorit~s publiques 6trangres n'est possible que si elle n'est pas de nature A porter atteinte A la
souverainetd, A la s~curit6, aux int~rets 6conomiques essentiels de la France ou A
l'ordre public, pr6cis6s par l'autorit6 administrative en tant que de besoin ...
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Translation of National Assembly Question and the
Minister of Justice's Response

Question

35893-September 29, 1980. Mr. Roger Chinaud draws the attention of the Minister of Justice to certain problems of interpretation which are posed by Article l-bis
for the activities of law firms and international lawyers .

. .

. Taking into account

the fact that such a provision could not be interpreted as opposing the activities of
the international law firms, he asks him if, in these circumstances, he does not
regard it necessary to establish for the use of members of this profession an interpretative document aimed at clearly establishing the new rules by which their activities
must henceforth be defined.
Response

The provisions of Article 1-bis have, as their main purpose, to have observed in
France the rules which define the procedures for obtaining evidence abroad. These
procedures result from . . . the provisions of the New Code of Civil Procedure...
and those of the Hague Convention of March 18, 1970. . . . together with the declaration made by the French government at the time of its ratification. . . . The pro-

cedures thus defined are aimed at giving full effect to our international relations for
judicial cooperation by permitting the carrying out on our territory of letters rogatory (letters of request) according to the special forms (Article 739 of the New Code
of Civil Procedure), as well as the putting into effect, according to well specified
conditions, of the procedure for obtaining evidence by commissioners (Hague Convention of March 18, 1970, Chapt. II). It permits moreover the offices of the public
prosecutor or the Chancellery, depending on the case, to control effectively the
observance of the governing principles of French procedure (Art. 744 of the New
Code of Civil Procedure, Arts. 16, 17 and 21 of the above-cited Hague Convention
and Arts. 2 and 3 of the declaration made by the French government). Article 1-his
of the law of July 16, 1980 approves the prohibition concerning procedure on
French territory with respect to any investigatory measures or operations searching
for evidence, in particular, by means of commissioners, which are outside of the
framework which has been defined by the New Code of Civil Procedure and by the
above-cited Hague-Convention of March 18, 1970, and in particular, which are
outside of the control of the public prosecutor's office or the Chancellery. This Article prohibits in addition the communication of documents or information when
these are requested or investigated outside of the framework defined by the law. On
the other hand, Article I-his does not prohibit the requesting, investigating or communicating of documents or information outside of the framework of foreign judicial or administrative proceedings. Similarly, the law obviously does not have as a
purpose either the hindering of business relations with foreign countries or the limiting or controlling ofthe relations ofinternationallawyers with their clients. Nonethe-

less, and in accordance with Article 1, the communication of documents or
information relating to economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters to foreign public authorities is only possible if it is not capable of harming the
sovereignty, security, essential economic interests of France or public policy, specified by the administrative authorities as necessary. . ..

